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This article focuses on the economic valuation of alternative clam management practices 
in the Venice Lagoon. The proposed valuation method is characterized by the design of 
a survey questionnaire next to the fishermen population. In each questionnaire two 
fishing alternatives are described. The respondent is asked to choose one of them. This 
valuation method, referred in the article as conjoint valuation, gives sufficient flexibility 
to set, alter, and combine different management practices. Furthermore, this approach 
presents an important advantage to the well-known contingent valuation method since it 
makes the monetary valuation of each management attribute possible. Estimation results 
of the random utility model show that fishermen’s willingness to pay for a larger clam 
fishing area is approximately 568 € per year. In addition, an individual fisherman would 
be willing to pay 1,005 € for a change from today’s fishing situation practice towards a 
fishing practice exclusively based on vibrant rake system. If we take into account the 
interaction between fishing management attributes and fishermen characteristics, we can 
see that the valuation of each management practice differs substantially across the two 
populations. We can observe that the population of fishermen that operate in the 
cooperative regime presents not only a higher monetary valuation for an increase in the 
dimension of the fishing concession, which is now valued at 811 €, but also a stronger 
willingness to pay for a change from today’s fishing situation towards a fishing practice 
exclusively based on vibrant rake system, which is now estimated at 2,456 €. Finally, the 
adoption of a clam fish management practice in Venice Lagoon that is exclusively based 
on the use of manual rakes, which is associated to the lowest damage to the Lagoon 
ecosystem, will represent a welfare loss of 5,904 € per fisherman per year. Combining 
this value with the total number of fishermen currently operating in the Lagoon of 
Venice, the welfare loss associated with the adoption of such clam management policy 
that is exclusively based on the use of manual rakes amounts to 11.8 € million per year. 
This figure can be regarded as an upper bound to the cost of implementation of a clam 
fishing system anchored in the use of manual, ecosystem friendly rakes. 
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I. Introduction 
This article focuses on the estimation, and discussion, of the economic valuation results of 
alternative clam fishing management practices in the Lagoon of Venice. The proposed 
valuation approach is anchored in the use of the stated preference methodology and it is 
characterized by the design of a contingent choice survey, which was carried out by personal 
interviewers (see ‘Exploring the use of stated preferences methods to value fish management 
practices’ for more details on the involved econometric modeling and survey design aspects).  
The organization of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the recent fish management 
practices, as a result of the introduction of exotic clam species in the Venice Lagoon. Section 
3 discusses the range of the economic estimates and evaluates these for different policy 
scenarios. Section 4 concludes. 
 
II. Statement of the natural resource problem 
A. Clam fish management practices in the lagoon of Venice 
Clam fishing in the Lagoon of Venice comes from several fishing activities. These include 
fishing in lagoon canals and water areas; valley fishing; farm fishing (aquaculture); and clam 
fishing (CVN 1999). These activities involved the harvest of two endemic species, Tapes 
decussatus, and Scrobicularia plana. Originally, clam fishing relied on manual rakes and 
triangular iron dredges, also known by the local fishermen population as ‘cassa’. Such a 
traditional fishing practice goes back to the Serenissima Republic as was characterized by 
many restrictions. For example, nets had to conform to pre-determined models, their mesh 
needed to be of a certain dimension, and fishing was absolutely forbidden in some periods of 
the year (see Ninni 1940, Pellizzato and Giorgiutti 1997). Until recently, clam fishing activity 
in the lagoon continued to be strongly regulated. The local authority together with fishing 
cooperatives controlled the fishing activity by fixing prices and amounts of catch, as well as 
defining and managing specific areas in the lagoon (Bevilacqua 1998). Furthermore, until the 
end of the Second World War motorboats were limited to the port of Chioggia. Elsewhere in 
lagoon there were only rowing and sailing boats. Their main fishing systems were limited to 
trawl nets, fyke-nets, gillnets, seine nets, and other manual equipments (Brunelli et al. 1940, 
Zolezzi 1944).  
Today more than 2,000 people are employed in the clam fishery sector. The current cam 
fishing practice is characterized by an open access situation. In other words, in order to fish in 
the Lagoon, it is necessary to buy a license. There is no limit of the total licenses issued per 
fishing season. This fact together with the high revenues associated with clam fishing have 3 
encouraged an increasing fishing effort, resulting in the adoption of technological intensive 
equipment and the progressive abandon of the traditional fishing practices (Pellizzato and 
Giorgiutti 1997). In this context, the Lagoon has been assisting the widespread of mechanical 
and vibrating fishing equipments, including the use of suction dredgers and rakes for 
harvesting clams (see Figure 1). 
 
*** Introduce Figure 1 about here *** 
 
B. The introduction of the exotic clam species 
The clam fishing effort in the Lagoon has strongly increased since 1983, coinciding with the 
introduction of Tapes philippinarum, also called the Manila clam
 in the Lagoon. This exotic 
species originally comes from the Indo-Pacific region and it has rapidly adapted to the lagoon 
environment. Now it is responsible for colonising large shallow areas and competing directly 
in the ecological niche with the endemic clam species. Furthermore, the relatively high 
market price of this species, ranging from 1.6 to 3.6 euro a kilogram, has contributed to an 
increase of the Manila clam fishing profitability. Because of the open access situation, many 
operators came into this activity. Most of them adopted mechanical equipment, such as the 
vibrating rake technology, used exclusively for the harvest of this shellfish. All together, this 
has led to significant in the fish management practices. For example, in 1998, the fishing fleet 
was composed of about 600 vessels, 84 of which used vibrating rake technology. The 
vibrating rake is equipped with an electrical cage, shaking and filtering sediment mechanisms 
with a capacity to harvest 150 to 200 kg of clam shellfish a day (Pellizzato et al 2000). Manila 
clams live at water bottom and for this reason they are very sensitive to water movements and 
to deposit and accumulation of water sediments (Orel et al. 1997). Since the harvest of this 
shellfish implies sediment movements, these have become exceptionally significant with the 
introduction of mechanical and vibrating fishing equipments. Therefore, the adoption of these 
vibrating technologies has brought unavoidable negative environmental impacts on the 
morphology, processes and marine life functions of the Lagoon (ICRAM 1994, Pranovi and 
Giovanardi 1994, Sfriso 2000).  
These management practices are currently are far and away from being a sustainable 
economical activity as they have been causing unprecedented damages to the marine system. 
For example, market data shows a diminishing supply of approximately 40% between 2000 
and 2001 due to a reduction in the clam's stock (see Granzotto et al. 2002 for additional 
details).  To make matters worse, such a heavy fishing pressure has been followed by an 4 
increased pollution in the Lagoon due to the neighborhood industrial activities, such a the oil 
refineries located at Marghera. These have also contributed to caused significant 
environmental damage to the marine ecosystem, including the destruction of nursery areas 
and feeding grounds of many commercial fishes. 
In such a context, the economic valuation of alternative clam management practices is of 
central importance since it sheds light in the involved welfare changes (see van den Bergh et 
al. 2002, Nunes and van den Bergh 2002). These can be compared with the benefits derived 
from protecting the Lagoon from environmental damage across alternative policy scenarios. 
Valuation results are presented and discussed in the following section. 
 
III. Monetary valuation results 
The questionnaire was carried out in summer 2001. The sampling was executed across the 
two main areas of the Lagoon: the northern area, including Burano, and the southern area. The 
questionnaire was performed by face-to-face interviews, involving the participation of 
researchers with high levels of field knowledge as the interviewers. The interviewers 
contacted 193 fishermen, 114 of which completed the questionnaire. The non-participation 
rate is therefore about 40 percent. Figure 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the surveys 
responses.  
 
*** Introduce Figure 2 about here *** 
 
The present questionnaire only contains one section, the contingent choice question. The 
empirical specification of the random utility model is characterized by decomposing the 
systematic utility component in terms of price of the permit, area of fishing concession, and 
the type of fishing system. The valuation results are presented in Table 1a. First, we can 
observe that all explanatory variable estimates reveal to be statistically significant at the 90 
percent level indicating that respondents receive an utility change whenever these change.  
Second, estimation results show that the probability of the choice of a management practice is 
positively related to the dimension of the fishing concession area, i.e. any policy option that is 
characterized by increasing the fishing area is ceteris paribus associated with an increase of 
the utility and therefore supported by the fishermen.  Third, the choice of a management 
practice reveals to be negatively related to its associated costs, reflecting the fact that higher 
prices result in lower utilities. Finally, the choice of a management practice reveals to be 
positively related to its degree of technology, measured in a three-level attribute. In other 5 
words, any policy option that is characterized by the exclusive use of a vibrant rake is, ceteris 
paribus, associated with a positive impact in fishermen’s welfare and thus connected with a 
higher probability of choice.   
 
*** Introduce Table 1a and Table 1b about here *** 
 
In the present application, stated preference results are used to predict the monetary impact of 
changing the dimension of the fishing area and type of fishing system on fishing behavior. 
Monetary valuation results show that the amount of money that an individual fisherman 
would be willing to pay for a change in the dimension of the fishing concession is 568 €. In 
addition, Table 3b shows that the economic welfare impact of a change in the clam 
management practice, due to a change in the fishing system amounts to 1,005 €. In other 
words, an individual fisherman would be willing to pay 1,005 € for a change from today’s 
fishing situation towards a fishing practice exclusively based on the vibrant rake system. 
We can also observe that only a relatively small part of the variance of the observed stated 
preference behavior can be explained by these fishing-related-attributes, the R
2 is about 19 
percent. As a consequence the respective monetary valuation results are characterized by 
relatively wide interval estimates. For example, according to Table 3b, fishermen’s WTP for a 
larger fishing concession ranges between 125 € and 1,732 €. In order to improve MNL 
estimation results, we study the degree to which preferences for fishing programs differ 
between the two segments of the fishermen population. In this context, two fishing segments 
were defined, corresponding to two types of fishing regimes in the Venice Lagoon. One 
fishing regime refers to a fishing fleet that is composed of vessels jointly managed by 
cooperatives. The other refers to a fishing regime that is characterized by smaller and 
individually owned  vessels. While the former are currently submitted to a set of cooperative 
managing rules, the latter are often managed by private individuals, who predominantly fish 
as a complementary income source to their main economic activity. In addition, some of these 
individuals are unauthorized or illegal fishermen.  
Therefore, we explore an additional model formulation, see Table 2a, which includes 
interactions of operations in collective regime and operations in individual regime (individual 
characteristics) with the attributes originally under consideration at the stated preferences 
model. In fact, the introduction of such information contributed to a significant qualitative 
improvement of our econometric model. This is now capable of explaining more than thirty 
percent of the variance of the observed stated preferences behavior – see R
2 in Table 2a. 6 
As before, estimation results show that as the price of the permit increases, utility decreases. 
Similarly, as the concession area increases, utility increases. In addition, regime interactions 
coefficients are added to the main effects for fishermen who operate in the cooperative 
regime. Since fishermen who operate in the individual regime are coded as zero, we can see 
that fishermen who operate in the cooperative regime present a higher sensitivity to the price 
of the permits, see the estimate for regime*price cross effect in Table 2a. In fact, for the 
population that operate in the individual regime, a price increase is characterized by a 
negative impact in the utility and estimated to be of the magnitude – 0.0007. In contrast, the 
fishermen population who operate in the cooperative regime this impact decreases to – 0.0028 
(= – 0.0007 – 0.0011). Independently of the type of fishermen, price estimates are statistically 
significant indicating that, everything held constant, fishermen continue to receive more 
utility from lower prices.  
 
*** Introduce Table 2a and Table 2b about here *** 
 
We can also observe that a change in the dimension of the concession area presents stronger 
impact on the utility of the population of the fishermen who operate in the cooperative regime 
than on fishermen who operate in the individual regime, 1.167 and 0.5814 respectively. 
Finally, estimation results show that the welfare impact of a change in the fishing system 
differs substantially across the two fishermen populations, which is particularly strong for the 
fishermen who operate in the cooperative regime. Such parameter estimates are reflected in 
the economic welfare measurements – see Table 2b. In fact, when comparing these valuation 
results with the ones presented in Table 1b, which represents the polled fisherman population, 
we can observe that the population of fishermen who operate in the cooperative regime 
present higher monetary valuation for an increase in the dimension of the fishing concession, 
which is now valued at 811 €. In addition, this population is characterized by a stronger 
willingness to pay for a change from today’s fishing situation towards a fishing practice 
exclusively based on vibrant rake system, which is now estimated at 2,456 €. 
Finally we address a policy issue related to the economic value assessment exercise of a 
change in the clam management practice in Lagoon Venice due to an adoption of a clam 
system exclusively based the use of manual rakes, which are described as the showing the 
lowest environmental damage. In other words, how much would it cost to pay all fishermen, 
independently of their current fishing equipment, to adopt such an environmental friendly 
clam fishing technology? According to our calculations – see Table 3a and 3b – the financial 7 
costs associated with the adoption of such a policy is estimated to be 5,904 € per fisherman 
per year, ranging up to a maximum of 80,160 € per fisherman per year, depending on the type 
of fishermen population and current management practice. Combining this value with the 
total number of fishermen currently operating in the Lagoon of Venice, the total welfare loss 
associated with the adoption of the manual clam fishing technology is estimated to at 11.8 € 
million per year. This information is crucial for the evaluation of the costs due to the adoption 
of a clam fishing system based on the use of manual rakes. In this context, this figure can be 
regarded as an lower bound to the benefits of implementation of a clam fishing system based 
associated with the lowest environmental damage in the Lagoon. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
This article focused on the economic valuation of alternative clam management practices in 
the Lagoon of Venice. The proposed valuation method is characterized by the design of a 
questionnaire. Estimation results show that: (1) fishermen bear an utility change whenever the 
price of the annual permit, the fishing technological system and the dimension of the fishing 
area change;  (2) the probability of the choice of a management practice is positively related 
to the dimension of the fishing concession area and the level of technology. In other words, 
any policy option that is characterized by the exclusive use of the vibrating and scrapers 
fishery system is associated with a positive impact in fishermen’s welfare. Furthermore, (3) 
the choice of a management practice reveals to be negatively related to its associated costs, 
reflecting the fact that higher prices of the annual permit result in lower utilities.  
In addition, economic results show that individual fisherman value: (1) positively the 
enlargement of the fishing area (ranging from 568 € to 811 €, ha/year); (2) positively the 
change from today’s fishing situation practice towards a fishing practice exclusively based on 
the vibrant rake system (ranging from 1,005 € to 2,455 €, year); (3) negatively the change 
from today’s fishing situation practice towards a fishing practice exclusively based in the use 
of manual, ecosystem friendly rakes (5,905 € to 80,160 €, year). Furthermore, combining the 
valuation results with the fishermen population (2,000) means that the adoption of a clam 
fishing management practice that is exclusively based on the use of the manual rakes will be 
associated with a welfare loss that ranges from 11.8 € to 160.3 € million per year. Such a 
range reflects that the welfare impact of a change in clam management practices differs 
substantially across the population of fishermen that operates in the cooperative regime and 
the population of fishermen that operates in the individual regime. Finally, from a policy 
perspective the adoption of a clam fish management practice anchored in the use of manual, 8 
ecosystem friendly rakes, and associated forgone environmental damages on the morphology 
processes and marine life functions, will require an annual a lump sum payment to the 
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Table 1a: Stated preferences model estimates 
(a) 
Variable Estimate  p-value 
Price of the permit  – 0.0006  0.000 
* 
Area     0.3340  0.005 
* 
Fishing system 
(b) –  0.6017  0.085 
** 
Adjusted R
2     0.1911   
Table 1b: Economic welfare measurement 
WTP for    Point estimate   95% Confidence Interval 
(d) 
Area   568  € 
(1.70)
 (c) 
[125 € ; 1 732 €] 
Fishing system 
(b)     1 005 € 
(1.36)
 (c) 
[– 119 € ; 3 236 €] 
 
  Notes:  
 
* (**) Statistically significant at 5% (10%). 
(a) Calculations are performed using the MULTINOMIAL LOGIT procedure in 
LIMDEP
®. 
(b) Ordinal categorical variable with 0 = today (benchmark), 1 = manual, and – 1 = 
vibrant. 
(c) t-values are computed using the delta method. 
 
















Table 2a: Stated preferences model estimates with cross effects for the fishing regime 
(a) 
Variable Estimate  p-value 
Price of the permit  – 0.0007  0.008 
* 
Area     0.5814  0.008 
* 
Fishing system 
(b)  – 1.7661  0.013  
Regime 
(c) * Price  – 0.0011  0.316 
Regime 
(c) * area     0.5856  0.492 
Regime 
(c) * system     4.2996  0.052 
* 
Adjusted R
2     0.3023   
Table 2b: Economic welfare measurement 
WTP for     Point estimate   95% Confidence Interval 
(e) 
Area   811  € 
(1.97)
 (d) 
[225 € ; 2 917 €] 
Fishing system 
(b)    2 456 € 
(1.84)
 (d) 
[403 € ; 8 340 €] 
    
  Notes:  
 
* (**) Statistically significant at 5% (10%). 




(b) Ordinal categorical variable (0 = today, 1 = exclusively manual, – 1 = exclusively 
vibrant). 
 
(c) Regime is a dummy variable with 1 denoting regime cooperative and 0 regime 
individual. 
 
(d) t-values are computed using the delta method. 
 
(e) CI is estimated using the asymtotic t-test method as described by Armstrong et al. 
(2001) 




Table 3a: Model estimation with cross effects for the fishing regime 
(a) 
Variable Estimate  p-value 
Price of the permit  – 0.0003  0.030 
* 
Area     0.2787  0.031 
* 
Fishing system = Manual  – 1.8644  0.013 
* 
Regime 
(b) * Price  – 0.0015  0.170 
Regime 
(b) * area     0.8888  0.292 
Regime 
(b) * manual     4.4041  0.048 
* 
Adjusted R
2     0.3023   
Table 3b: Economic welfare measurement 
WTP for     Point estimate   95% Confidence Interval 
(d) 
Fishing system = Manual    – 5 904 € 
(1.66)
 (c) 
[– 80 160 € ; – 953 €] 
    
  Notes:  
 
*   Statistically significant at 5%. 




(b) Regime is a dummy variable with 1 denoting regime cooperative and 0 regime 
individual 
 
(c) t-values are computed using the delta method. 
 
(d) CI is estimated using the asymtotic t-test method as described by Armstrong et al. 
(2001) 
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Source: Boatto et al.  (2002) 







                 Source: Boatto et al.  (2002) 
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